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Dam Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of India: Situating the Case of
Mullaperiyar Dam Dispute
S. G. SREEJITH

ABSTRACT
The Mullaperiyar dam dispute between the South Indian states of
Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which pertains to the safety of a 126-year-old dam,
despite a ruling by the Supreme Court of India to retain the dam, keeps on
reappearing before the Court in one way or other. The primary reason for
such a recurrence is the fear of 4 million people of Kerala living downstream
the century-old dam. Yet the Court has been reluctant to make a final
settlement to the dispute and keeps on encouraging the states to find a
solution through the political process.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to deal with this issue, prompts
this article to inquire into the dam jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
India. The inquiry which is based on the Court’s approach to two major dam
disputes in India—the Narmada dam dispute and the Tehri dam dispute—
informs that the Court has been a victim of its own analytic which the Court
has developed from India’s post-independent developmental ambitions.
Every time the Court sits on a dam dispute, it falls into this analytic and
rules for the dam, against other submissions for the protection of
environment, culture, livelihood, or even the lives of people. This article
argues that if the Court wants to settle the Mullaperiyar dam dispute, it
should transcend its analytic. Towards this, the article builds an alternative
analytic on dams and situates the Mullaperiyar dam dispute within that
analytic. The article argues that the Supreme Court is the only potential site
and effective means for the settlement of the Mullaperiyar dam dispute.
“You were once a river, meandering gently through the jungles, gurgling
noisily along the woods and splashing relentlessly against the rocks—
untamed, restless and swanky, Weren’t you? . . . Tell me, please, how it
felt to become placid, quiet, calm and serene all of a sudden? . . . And, are
129
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you still a river at heart”?

—Mary Swarnalatha Rabindran, Forget-Me-Nots of Mullaperiyar:
An Autumn Dream (2015).
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INTRODUCTION: THE MULLAPERIYAR DAM DISPUTE
The Mullaperiyar Dam has been a bone of contention between the South
Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Constructed under the supervision
of Colonel John Pennycuick of the British Government in 1895, the Dam,
which was supposed to have a lifespan of 50 years, has outlived its age to
turn 127 years on October 10, 2022. What is problematic about the Dam is
its age, posing the threat of a breakage, which is a cause of deep anguish and
concern for the people of Kerala as it is the downstream state. If the Dam
breaks, 4 districts of Kerala, and all living and non-living things thereof,
which includes 4 million human lives, will be washed off to the Arabian Sea.
Hence, there has been widespread demand in Kerala for decommissioning
the Mullaperiyar Dam. Tamil Nadu, to where the waters of Mullaperiyar are
diverted, is the beneficiary of the Dam. Five districts of Tamil Nadu rely on
the waters of Mullaperiyar for irrigation. Hence, loss of the Dam or its waters
or both would result in severe draught in the region, which is otherwise poor
in water resources.1
The Mullaperiyar Dam is situated in the Idukki district of Kerala,
although Tamil Nadu has the operating rights of the Dam based on a lease
agreement signed between the ruler of erstwhile Travancore and the British
Secretary of State for India for a period of 999 years.2 Although the lease
became invalid after Indian Independence, it was given a fresh life by the
Government of Kerala in 1970. But the first dispute between the states
apropos of the Dam had arisen in 1900 when the erstwhile Government of
Madras wanted to generate hydroelectric power from the Dam.3 Following
the objection by the Travancore State, the Periyar Arbitration Tribunal was
constituted.4 Although the Tribunal ruled that the lessee had no right to use
the waters other than for irrigation purposes, subsequent negotiations
between the states would lay foundations for granting absolute right to Tamil
Nadu for the use and exploitation of the water resources of the Dam.
The first concern regarding the safety of the dam arose in 1925 when
the Times of India reported that the great floods of 1924 have damaged the
1. On the respective claims of both states, see A.J. Thatheyus, Delphin Dhanaseeli & P.
Vanitha, Inter-State Dispute Over Water and Safety in India: The Mullaperiyar Dam, a
Historical Perspective, 1 AM. J. WATER RESOURCES 10,18 (2013).
2. Anirrudha Ghosal, Mullaperiyar Dam, 999-Year Lease at the Heart of Acrimony
between
TN
and
Kerala,
NEWS18
(Aug.
25,
2018),
https://www.news18.com/news/india/mullaperiyar-dam-999-year-lease-at-the-heart-ofacrimony-between-tamil-nadu-and-kerala-1856279.html.
3. PRADEEP DAMODARAN, THE MULLAPERIYAR WATER WARS: THE DAM THAT DIVIDED
TWO STATES 43 (2014).
4. Id.
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Dam and rendered it unsafe.5 This concern subsided after the report by
Superintending Engineer C.T. Mullings that the dam is safe and that the
concerns are unfounded.6 Although there were many disgruntled murmurs
about the safety of the dam, the concerns mounted to a sizable proportion in
1979 with the collapse of the Morvi Dam in Gujarat.7 A subsequent study
conducted by the Centre for Earth Science Studies informed that the
Mullaperiyar dam cannot withstand a massive earthquake of a magnitude of
6 in Richter scale and more.8 Following this, an inspection held by the
Central Water Commission (CWC) of the Government of India, observed
that the Dam is safe, although the CWC suggested a series of measures—
emergency, medium, and long-term—to further strengthen the Dam and to
keep the water level at 136 feet.9 It took 20 years for Tamil Nadu to complete
the recommended strengthening measure.10 Yet, no consensus could be
reached among the states as to the maximum water level. Kerala held that
safety measures would be complete only if the water level is maintained at
136 feet, whereas Tamil Nadu argued that considering the safety measures
taken, water level should be raised to at least 142 feet.11 Thenceforth, courts
became the battle ground for both the states.
In 1998, Dr. Subramanian Swamy, an Indian parliamentarian from
Tamil Nadu, filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court to give
directions to raise the water level to 152 feet, which was opposed by the
Government of Kerala citing the safety of the people living downstream.12
Around the same time, a writ petition was filed before the High Court of
Kerala to allow the Government of Kerala to maintain the water level at 136
feet. These petitions triggered the filing of a series of writ petitions before
both Madras High Court and the High Court of Kerala.13 However, due to
5. Shenoy Karun, Mullaperiyar Dam: Interstate Row Started with TOI Report, TIMES
INDIA (May 8, 2014), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/mullaperiyar-daminterstate-row-started-with-toi-report/articleshow/34795705.cms.
6. DAMODARAN, supra note 3 at 24.
7. Two States and a Dam: Let Technical Assessments Find a Solution to Mullaperiyar
Stand-off,
BUS.
STANDARD
(Jan.
2,
2013),
https://www.businessstandard.com/article/opinion/two-states-and-a-dam-111120800035_1.html.
8. Id.
9. M.P. Ram Mohan and Krittika Chavaly, The Supreme Court of India and the InterState Water Dispute: An Analysis of the Judgments on Mullaperiyar Dam, 17 WATER POC’Y
1003, 1008 (2015).
10. DAMODARAN, supra note 3 at 27.
11. Id.
12. James Wilson, Mullaperiyar: In Search of Truth, BLOGSPOT (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://jamewils.blogspot.com/2011/11/litigation-history.html.
13. Id.
OF
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the conflicting nature of these petitions, the matter was transferred to the
Supreme Court of India. As per the orders of the Supreme Court, the Minister
of Water Resources of the Government of India convened the meeting of
both states on May 19, 2000.14 However, the meeting did not obtain any
“positive result” and hence, the Ministry of Water Resources constituted an
expert committee to examine the safety aspect of the Dam and submit a
report to the Supreme Court.15 The Expert Committee submitted its final
report to the Ministry in 2001, “recommending the raising of water level to
142 feet without delay and consider raising it to 152 [feet] after strengthening
the baby dam” adjacent to the Mullaperiyar Dam.16 Subsequently, through
its decision in Mullaperiyar Environmental Forum v. Union of India and
Others, the Supreme Court acknowledged the recommendations in the report
and sanctioned the raising of water level to 152 feet after necessary expert
approvals.17
Subsequent to this ruling, in 2006, the Government of Kerala amended
the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation Act of 2003, by which the
water level of Mullaperiyar Dam was fixed at 136 feet “from the deepest
point of the level of Periyar river at the site of the main dam”.18 This
amendment has prompted Tamil Nadu to file an original suit in the Supreme
Court against the State of Kerala.19 The Supreme Court held that the Kerala
Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 “passed by the
Kerala Legislature is unconstitutional in its application to and effect on the
Mullaperiyar dam”.20 The Court also upheld the water limit of 142 feet and
to assuage the concerns of Kerala, it created a framework for constantly
monitoring the safety of the Dam.21
14. MINISTRY OF JAL SHAKTI, MULLAPERIYAR DAM ISSUE [hereinafter Mullaperiyar Dam
Issue], http://mowr.nic.in/Previous-site/ImpIssues/PenRiver.pdf.
15. DAMODARAN, supra note 3 at 28.
16. MADHUSOODANAN C.G. & SREEJA K.G., THE MULLAPERIYAR CONFLICT 14 (Narendar
Pani ed., 2010).
17. Writ Petition of Supreme Court of India at 17, Mullaperiyar Environmental
Protection Forum v. Union of India & Ors (2006) (No. 386 of 2001).
18. The Amendment Act inserted Section 62A by which in all dams (including
Mullaperiyar Dam) in the State of Kerala listed in Schedule II of the Act,
[N]o Government, custodian or any other agency shall increase, augment, add to or
expand the Full Reservoir Level Fixed or in any other way do or omit to do any act
with a view to increase the water level fixed and set out in THE SECOND
SCHEDULE. Such level shall not be altered except in accordance with the
provisions of this Act in respect of any Scheduled dam.
19. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and Anr, (2014) 12 SCC 810 [hereinafter
Original Suit)
20. Id. at ¶ 221.
21. Id.
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During the pendency of the matter before the Supreme Court, studies
were conducted by the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi and IIT
Roorkee as commissioned by the State of Kerala. They found the Dam to be
unsafe hydrologically and seismically.22 The Kerala Cabinet also approved
a preliminary study on the feasibility of a new Dam at the disputed site.23
Altogether, the matter was heard, and orders were passed by the
Supreme Court in 2001-2014, 2017-2018, and 2021. However, despite all
these efforts, the matter remains unsettled and both states continue to have
their respective woes and grievances apropos of the Dam.
The Supreme Court’s failure to settle the matter is certainly not the sole
reason for the continuation of the dispute without resolution, although it is
one among the few. Lack of political willingness and determination,
improper assessments of the safety of the Dam, conflicting but genuine
nature of the concerns, the failure of both states to see each other’s point, and
the missing focus on human and other relevant factors in all efforts to address
the dispute, also contribute substantially to the issue. However, what this
article is interested is in the Supreme Court’s role only. It is not just the
Mullaperiyar Dam, but whenever there was a Dam-related dispute before the
Apex Court, it found itself in an ambivalence, as if fallen in a trap. This
article argues that the said ambivalence is caused by the Supreme Court’s
own “dam analytic” which has been motivated by the Nehruvian perspective,
and that which the Supreme Court has been upholding, that “Dams are
temples of modern India.” This imagery of a dam etched in the memory and
consciousness of the Supreme Court has led to a “dam jurisprudence” which
gives primacy to the developmental aspirations of India over everything else.
By way of examining the said hypothesis, Part II of this article analyzes
the positions, often conflicting, taken by the Supreme Court of India on the
Mullaperiyar issue. It problematizes the prolongation of a dispute and the
failure to give a right-based decision on the matter. In Part III, the article
presents the dam jurisprudence of the Supreme Court through the Court’s
positions on two other dam-related disputes heard by it—the cases
concerning Narmada dam and Tehri dam—and confirms that the Supreme
Court is a victim of its own analytic. Part IV suggests a paradigm approach
which can help the Supreme Court transcend its analytic and advance the
dam jurisprudence. It is hoped that such a paradigm shift will have the
Mullaperiyar dam issue getting resolved amicably and with positive and
optimal outcomes.

22. MADHUSOODANAN & SREEJA, supra note 16, at 15
23. Id.
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I. MULLAPERIYAR DAM DISPUTE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
“I sign this Agreement with the blood from my heart”
—Maharaja Visakhom Thirunal Rama Varma

A. Mullaperiyar Environmental Forum v. Union of India and Others
The first major case brought before the Supreme Court was
Mullaperiyar Environmental Forum v. Union of India and Others.24 This
writ petition was filed in 2001 in the wake of the CWC’s recommendation
to increase the water level of the Dam to 142 feet. This recommendation was
challenged by the Petitioner. The Petitioner’s concern was centered on the
safety of the Dam which was, at the time of the dispute, 106 years old. Hence,
any raise in the water level above 136 feet jeopardizes the safety of the Dam.
Supporting this contention, the Petitioner had drawn the attention of the
Court to the primitive technology used in the construction of the Dam, the
two failures of the Dam during its construction, the devastation its breakage
might cause in Kerala, the seismological vulnerability of the region, and the
exclusion of Kerala from the inspections of the CWC.25 The Petitioner also
questioned the technical competency of the CWC. The State of Tamil Nadu
rebutted these contentions as “ill-founded,” “baseless,” and “incorrect.”26 It
submitted that, considering the recommendations of the CWC and the safety
measures taken by Tamil Nadu, the State should be allowed to raise the water
level to 152 feet.
It was at this juncture that the Ministry of Water Resources constituted
the Expert Committee as per the orders of the Court, which although
recommended for the raise of the water level to 142 feet and later on to 152
feet, recommended extensive safety measures and repairs wherever
needed.27 The State of Kerala, however, continued to resist to raise the water
level.
In the Writ Petition, the Petitioner subsequently relied inter alia on
questions about the constitutional validity of the Lease Agreement signed
between the Maharaja of Travancore and the British Government in the light
of the States Reorganization Act of 1956 which created the State of Kerala.
The State also questioned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the
dispute. On the substantive part, the Petitioner pleaded that the increased
water level would result in the submergence of the Forest area in breach of
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra note 17 at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
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Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980, which imposes
restrictions on the deforestation of forests for non-forest purposes. The
Petitioner also flagged the potential breach of the Wildlife (Protection) Act
of 1972, which requires prior permission of the Central Government for
altering the boundaries of a sanctuary and tiger reserve, such as the Periyar
basin where the Mullaperiyar Dam is located.28
The arguments advanced by the Petitioner to highlight the potential
damage to the flora and fauna of the region was dismissed by the Court on
both technical and substantive grounds. The Court found that the no
boundaries of the 777 square kilometers of the Periyar sanctuary—of which
only 8,000 acres is of the dam project— gets altered by the raise in the water
level. This position of the court is technically correct in terms of the language
of Article 26(A) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, but it stands in
contradiction to the philosophy of the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980,
which aims to prevent, “breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion
thereof for any purpose other than reafforestation” [emphasis added].29 The
Court, however, reasoned its position by stating that the Dam has been in
existence since 1979 and that the water level used to be 152 feet. Hence, the
strengthening efforts of the Dam and the raise in the water level cannot be
considered as non-forestry activity and a threat to the flora and fauna.30
On the substantive part of the Petitioner’s contention about the damage
to flora and fauna and loss of biodiversity of the Periyar region, the Court
informed that things are, rather, to the contrary—
[T]here will be improvement in the environment. It is on record that the
fauna, particularly, elephant herds and the tigers will be happier when the
water level slowly rises to touch the forest line. In nature, all birds and
animals love water spread and exhibit their exuberant pleasure with heavy
rains filling the reservoir resulting in lot of greenery and ecological
environment around.31

The Court, drawing on the report of the Expert Committee, waxed
eloquent on the ecosystem improvement the water level raise can make.
The most productive habitats in terms of forage availability to ungulates
and elephants are these vayals. This habitat is of even greater significance
to wildlife since the green flush of protein rich grasses appears at a time
when nutritive quality of forest forage is lowest. This is so since water is
likely to be released from the Dam during the dry months for irrigation.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, §§26(A), 38(W), 51.
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 §2.
Writ Petition, 2001, supra note 17 at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
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Thus, this nutrient rich biomass is critical for maintaining condition of
herbivores and their populations during the pinch period.32

The Court did not find any “substance” in the argument of Kerala that
“there will be adverse effect on environment,” but did find that the
apprehensions of the Petitioner and the people of Kerala are “baseless.”33
Disposing the petition, the Court directed the State of Kerala to not create
any obstructionist measures in Tamil Nadu while carrying out maintenance
of the Dam.
The entire reasoning of the Supreme Court in this case is based on
expert reports. But was there no reason or cause for the Supreme Court to
look beyond what was submitted before it? Since the Expert Committee had
found a 106-year-old dam to be safe to store 152 feet of water with proper
maintenance, the Court had let the matter to be so. Yet, some level of
evaluation of the expert opinion was warranted from the Court, as expert
opinion before a judge is not conclusive, at least from a judicial perspective;
rather, it is a material to be analyzed and examined.34 It is the judicial
engagement with the expert opinion which gives the parties a sense of trust
in the court’s reliance on expert opinion.35 The State of Kerala, the aggrieved
state, had chosen to question the credibility of the expert committees inside
and outside the Court, which is due to the uncritical overreliance of the
Supreme Court on expert opinions.36
Further, it was not an environmental concern (the loss of flora and
fauna) which had prompted the Petitioner to approach the Supreme Court,
but the apprehensions and fears of 4 million people living downstream in
Kerala. Ironically, when establishing its jurisdiction on the Mullaperiyar
Dam dispute, the Court held that the matter in question is a not a “water
dispute” and the issue is about the “safety” of the Dam. Yet, it is debatable
whether the safety dimension, and the related apprehensions thereof,
received a proper examination by the Court. Perhaps the Petitioner did not
present their motivation well before the Court; instead of laying emphasis on
the safety of the people and their right to lead a life without the fear of a Dam
collapse, they relied on environmental concerns which have greater appeal,
32. Id., and see also R. Sreenivasan, Historical Validity of Mullaperiyar Project, 49
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 22 (2014).
33. Id.
34. See generally Marcello Gaboardi, How Judges Can Think? The Use of Expert’s
Knowledge as Proof in Civil Proceedings, 18 GLOB. JURIST. (2001).
35. Id.
36. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Mullaperiyar: A Matter of Judicial Overreach, THE HINDU
(May 16, 2014), https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/mullaperiyar-a-matter-of-judicial
-overreach/article6013138.ece.
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which had the Petitioner losing the case.
B. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and Another
This original suit was filed before the Supreme Court by the State of
Tamil Nadu, having been provoked by the Kerala Government’s amendment
to the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation Act of 2003, by the Kerala
Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act of 2006, which fixed
the limits of the water level of the Mullaperiyar Dam to 136 feet. This
amendment was subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum.
The State of Tamil Nadu questioned the constitutionality of the
Amendment and prayed to the Court to declare it null and void. It also sought
a decree of permanent injunction restraining Kerala from obstructing Tamil
Nadu from increasing the water level to 142 feet.37 The State of Kerala, while
defending their legislative rights to amend the Kerala Irrigation and Water
Conservation Act of 2003, also invoked the legality of the 1886 Agreement
which led to the construction of the Dam. The State of Kerala also submitted
that “a dam could never have been intended to remain for long years without
decommissioning at some point of time. For this background, people in
Kerala living in the downstream region of the Mullaperiyar dam have raised
serious apprehensions against the safety of the structure.”38
Due to the involvement of the constitutional questions, the Suit, which
was originally heard by a three-judge Bench for 4 years, was transferred to
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.39 This move by the Supreme
Court would soon shift the focus of the Suit from the safety and sustainability
element to the constitutional questions, as it is the primary mandate of the
Constitution Bench to address the “question of law as to the interpretation of
the Constitution.” 40 In a survey on the performance of Constitution Benches
of the Supreme Court of India, Nick Robinson et al., present that most of the
decisions of the Constitution Benches are “convoluted” to the extent of them
becoming “increasingly difficult to even determine the winning party.” 41
Additionally, in this case of the Suit in question, the extensiveness of the
37. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala & Another (2014) 12 SCC 810,10.
38. Id, at ¶ 25.
39. Id. at ¶ 35.
40. The Constitution of India 1949, art. 145(3) (Ind.).
41. Nick Robinson et al., Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution
Benches Since Independence, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 27, 27 (2011). See also Virendra
Kumar, Statement of Indian Law: Supreme Court of India Through Its Constitution Bench
Decisions Since 1950—A Juristic Review of Its Intrinsic Value and Juxtaposition, 58 J. INDIAN
L. INST. 189 (2016).
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judgment, which has to be understood as resulting from the zealousness of
the Court to clarify legal questions, has resulted in “adding confusion rather
than clarity” apropos of the subject matter in question.42
Under the Constitution Bench, since the safety of the Dam, strangely,
had become part of the legality of the 1886 agreement and the
constitutionality of the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation
(Amendment) Act of 2006, the Supreme Court was left with no means to
assess the safety aspects of the Dam. Hence, it constituted an Empowered
Committee (EC) comprising of three former judges of the Supreme Court
and two technical experts with the mandate to study the safety aspects of the
Dam.43 In its Order dated February 18, 2010, rationalizing the need of the
EC, the Court stated that there shall be a separation of the real issues from
the thickets of legal issues:
[A]part from the legal and constitutional issues, inter alia, the real
grievance that concerns the State of Tamil Nadu is of not being able to
increase reservoir level of Mullai Periyar Dam to 142 feet. The concern of
the State of Kerala, on the other hand, appears to be relating to the safety
of the Dam.44

In the Suit in question, the Constitutional bench clubbed the issues
relating to the legality of the 1886 Agreement with the sustainability of the
Suit and its own jurisdiction over it. After extensive analysis of the facts,
relevant legislations, and precedents, the Court, in its characteristic judicial
eloquence and ingenuity, made some well-reasoned observations,
highlighting many flaws in the practice and arguments of the State of Kerala,
then upheld the 1886 lease agreement as valid and established its jurisdiction
on the Suit.
Then the Court clubbed the issues relating to the constitutionality of the
Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act of 2006, with
the raising of the water level to 142 feet and then to 152 feet. Upon
examining a rich array of Indian and foreign judgments, particularly the
decision on Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum, the Court held
that the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act of
2006, was “unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application to and effect on
the Mullaperiyar dam.”45 The Court also pronounced that the judgment in
Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum would operate “as res
42.
43.
44.
(2010).
45.

See Write Petition, 2001, supra note 17, at 9-10.
Mohan & Chavaly, supra note 9 at 1010.
Transcript of Order, State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala & Another, 12 SCC 810
Original Suit, 2006, ¶ 199 (i).
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judicata on the issue of the safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising the water
level to 142 feet and ultimately to 152 feet.”46
While the Supreme Court has delivered a judgment good in law, the
judgment did not lead to the settlement of the dispute. Tamil Nadu dubbed
the judgement as a “sweet victory”, and Kerala as “unfortunate” to the people
of the State.47 The sentiment in Kerala was that a “just” demand was by
rejected by the Court, as its stance was “water for Tamil Nadu and safety for
Kerala”.48 Opposition Leader of the Government lamented that the Supreme
Court, by its decision, has only heighted the fear of 4 million people living
in 5 districts of the State.49
In fact, if the dispute is analyzed on its merits, the Kerala’s demands are
for the lives of its 4 million people and Tamil Nadu’s for the livelihood and
survival of its people. Kerala is willing to give the entire waters of
Mullaperiyar and all the benefits accruing from the waters to Tamil Nadu.
Why then is the dispute hovering around raising and/or lowering a few feet
of waters from the Dam? Assuming that Tamil Nadu is skeptical about the
curious turn things might take if a new Dam is constructed, then why is the
State of Kerala not giving the assurance that the waters of Mullaperiyar will
continue to flow to Tamil Nadu from the newly constructed Dam as a matter
of Tamil Nadu’s ownership and right? Indeed, these are political problems,
and the states probably do not want this to be debated in court. Hence, they
have chosen other legal imaginations which are not directly relevant to the
main concerns.
The State of Kerala, whose sole purpose of fighting the dispute is
actually the protection of the lives and safety of its people, has chosen to
address the matter through an unconstitutional act and to claim
constitutionality to that act. Earlier in Mullaperiyar Environmental
Protection Forum, the State had chosen to raise environmental concerns
about the existence of a Dam which had been in its territory for more than a
century. In both the original suit and in Mullaperiyar Environmental
Protection Forum, Kerala had also asserted the lack of jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. It is this course of action which had the Supreme Court
ruling against the State of Kerala and not finding a permanent solution

46. Id. at ¶ 199(iii).
47. Dam Height Hike Allowed: Tamil Nadu Pleased, Kerala Unhappy (Intro Roundup),
BUS. STANDARD (May 7, 2014), https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/damheight-hike-allowed-tamil-nadu-pleased-kerala-unhappy-intro-roundup114050704158_1.html.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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satisfactory to both the parties.
Indeed, the State of Kerala relied on the “precautionary principle,” a
fundamental principle of international environmental law, incorporated in
Article 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which
declares that “lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures,” especially when and “where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage.”50 However, instead of using the
Principle to highlight the safety of the Dam and construction of a new Dam
or any other alternatives, the State used the precautionary principle to justify
the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act of 2006.
And quite obviously, the Supreme Court found the use of the precautionary
principle to justify a legislative decision on a matter which has been
judicially decided as unconstitutional.
It is true that the State of Kerala has misplaced its arguments,
whatsoever be the reasons for that, however, the Supreme Court should not
have missed the point and, while upholding constitutional values, should
have separated the safety element in Kerala’s arguments (and of course, the
sustainability and wellbeing of the people of Tamil Nadu) from the
submissions of Kerala. However, it is not the case that the Court absolutely
did not pay any attention to the safety aspect—it did frame the issue as
“[w]hether the offer of the first defendant [State of Kerala], to construct a
new dam across River Periyar in the downstream region of Mullai Periyar
Dam would meet the ends of justice and requirements of plaintiff.” 51 But the
Court did not pay deserving attention to the idea of decommissioning of the
existing dam, which was constructed using primitive technologies, and
construction of a new and safer dam using the most advanced dam
technology.52 Instead, the Court uncritically, and with a pinch of
“admiration”, relied on the report of the EC, which suggested better means
for repairing the Dam and for better water evacuation in case of a breakage
and rebuffed the issue.53 The Supreme Court also did not adequately engage
with the study report submitted by IIT Delhi and IIT Roorkee and the
depositions of Dr. A.K. Gosain, Professor at IIT Delhi about the hydrological
50. WORLD CONF. ON ENV’T & DEV., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. 1) (June 1992).
51. State of Tamil Nadu, 12 SCC 810 at ¶ 32(9).
52. The court dismissed this issue in the following limited words: “In this view of the
matter for the construction of new dam, there has to be agreement of both the parties. The
offer made by Kerala cannot be thrusted upon Tamil Nadu. Issue No.9, therefore, has to be
decided against Kerala and it is so held”. Id., at ¶ 213.
53. Id. At ¶ 198. (“The EC, we must say, has completed its task admirably by thoroughly
going into each and every aspect of the safety of Mullaperiyar dam”).
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vulnerability of the dam, and Dr. D.K. Paul and Dr. M.K. Sharma, Professors
of IIT Roorkee about the seismological vulnerability of the region and the
threat they pose to the Dam. The Court decided to let the EC’s findings
prevail over all other scientific reports without proving the respective
findings of the IITs wrong.
It is true that the Suit did not transpire well in the Supreme Court,
primarily due to the incorrect approach of the parties. Or perhaps, as the
prominent water policy expert Ramaswami R. Iyer observed, that the
Supreme Court “has allowed itself to be embroiled into the politics of the
dispute which was meant to be settled through ‘mutual agreement,’ or
through the Inter-State Council, a constitutional body.”54 This article,
however, does not subscribe to the latter view, as it would assert that the
Supreme Court has the potential to settle this dispute, provided it transcends
its orthodoxy in its Dam Jurisprudence and adopts a modernist approach.
C. Russel Joy v. Union of India and Others
The third case was filed before the Supreme Court in 2017 by a “public
spirited person” as a writ petition to direct the “Government of India to
appoint an international agency with the technical expertise to study and to
adjudge the lifespan of Mullaperiyar Dam and ascertain the date/period on
which the said dam must be de-commissioned”.55 The Petitioner also
requested the Court to direct the State of Tamil Nadu to “make financial
provisions for damages to life and restoration of environment in the
eventuality of a burst of Mullaperiyar Dam before it is de-commissioned.”
The Petition, unlike the original suit, directly addressed the safety of the
people of Kerala. It stated,
[B]ecause of the efflux of time and the safety of the dam being doubtful,
fear remains embedded among the people who reside downstream of the
Mullaperiyar dam. That apart, the residents of the area in proximity do not
feel safe. In such a situation, as set forth, precautionary steps are required
to be taken to protect the life without waiting for a disaster to happen in
the form of a dam burst which can be triggered due to multiple reasons.56

The Petition further urged,
[T]hat safety and security of the people and that of the nation are of
paramount importance and, therefore, the respondents are obligated in law
to have concrete safeguards so that there is [sic] no irreversible
54. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Mullaperiyar: A Plea for Sanity, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 12
(2011).
55. Russel Joy v. Union of Indian & Ors, Writ Pet. 878.
56. Id. At ¶ 4.
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environmental consequences and the fear that affects the bones and brains
of the citizens gets vaporised.57

Letting the people in the 4 districts of Kerala to live in constant fear and
apprehension, as per the Petitioner, is a failure on the part of the state to fulfil
the guarantee of life in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.58 Since unlike
in the original suit the safety aspect was directly brought to the attention of
the Court, it took cognizance of the matter in most eloquent terms and with
earnest concern for the people, which is worth quoting at length for its sheer
elegance:
It is to be borne in mind that life without basic needs of life and liberty
replete with fear, is like a concept without structure, a house without a
plinth, a metaphor not conveying an idea, a sea without waves or, for that
matter, an idea constantly remaining in the realm of speculation. Life and
liberty are to be understood, projected and protected in concrete terms. It
is because fear brings numbness to passion of purpose and converts an
active individual a quitter who resigns himself to fate. History records with
sorrow and agony how civilisations have perished mostly due to fear.
Citizenry growth stands still, for culture and creativity take the back seat
when fear reigns. Some may say that there is no fear but the man who is
so told, may appear to be consoled though his heart or mind may not be
convinced. Therefore, it is the duty of the States involved to create a sense
of confidence in the real sense of the term and ensure that adequate
measures have been taken so that in any event safety of the individuals
shall not be affected and well preserved and their life and liberty remain
protected. To speak differently, steps taken should reflect convincing and
concrete perceptibility and not merely a consolatory shadow.59

In pursuit of safety, the Court emphasized on disaster management,
which also includes “prevention of danger or threat of any disaster.”60
Invoking the Disaster Management Act of 2005, the Court directed the
Central Government and the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to constitute
sub-committees to prepare “to face any disaster occurring from Mullaperiyar
Dam.”61 The effort of the Supreme Court was to see how best to alleviate the
fears of the people living downstream. But did the Court understand the
nature of their fear properly or further investigate into it? Perhaps not, as the
Court, relying on the EC Report, reiterated that all these efforts at disaster
management “does not anyway remotely suggest that there is any doubt
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. At ¶ 5.
Id. At ¶ 8.
Id. At ¶ 22.
Disaster Management Act, 2005, §2I.
Russel Joy, at ¶ 23(1), 23(2).
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about the safety or life span of the dam, as is alleged in the writ petition. We
have said so only keeping in view the consequences of unpredictable
disaster, which have astutely been canvassed before us.” 62 Most of the
concerns raised by the Petitioner remained unaddressed, leaving some
uncomfortable questions: Why did the Court not approve investigation of the
Dam by an international agency? Should the silence of the Supreme Court
on all other questions raised by the Petitioner, including questions on the
decommissioning of the Dam and indemnification to the people in the event
of a disaster, be treated as the Court’s conviction that the Dam is safe and all
fears are misplaced? The much larger concern, which would be verified in
the next part of this essay, is that apropos of dams—a concept which
advanced countries of the world have left behind for effective alternatives—
the Supreme Court is not able to appreciate their life-span and look beyond
their sustenance.
D. Beyond Russel Joy v. Union of India and Others
In August 2018, the State of Kerala witnessed one of its worst floods
due to abnormally high rainfall followed by landslides, which resulted in
severe flooding in 13 out of 14 districts of the State.63 The calamity caused
the death of 339 people and severe damage to housing, land, agriculture,
fisheries, animal husbandry, power, irrigation, and water sector, and to
public infrastructure.64 The intensity of rainfall and the rising water levels in
the dams in the state prompted the Government to open the shutters of 22
dams in the state, including the shutters of the super massive Idukki dam. A
study conducted by the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People
(SANDRP) observed that, dams and the unscientific dam management,
including breach of rule curves, in Kerala had contributed to the 2018 floods,
which is contrary to the report submitted by the CWC.65 The calamity
repeated in 2020, although with a lesser intensity, but killing 104 people and
severely damaging land and infrastructure.66 Again in 2021, Kerala
witnessed high-intensity floods causing severe landslides which killed 26
people.67 Learning from the disaster in the past, the Government of Kerala
62. Id. at ¶ 24.
63. Memorandum, State Government of Kerala State Relief Commissioner, Disaster
Management (Additional Chief Secretary), Kerala Floods - 2018 (Sept. 13, 2018).
64. Id. at 20-29.
65. See Himanshu Thakkar, Role of Dams in Kerala Flood Disaster, 53 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 20 (2018).
66. Situation Report, Ministry of Home Affairs Disaster Management Division National
Emergency Response Centre (Aug. 18, 2020).
67. HUMANITARIAN AID INT’L, Situation Report on Kerala Floods and Landslides (Oct.
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had timely opened the shutters of the Idukki dam when its water level
reached full-capacity. The spillway shutters of the Mullaperiyar dam were
also raised when the water level had crossed the rule curve of 138 feet.68
These developments ignited the fear of the people of Kerala and new
writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Court in October 2021.
However, the petitions only sought to maintain the water level at 139 feet.
The Petition also brought to the attention of the Supreme Court a joint study
report of the United Nations University (UNU) and the Institute for Water
Environment and Health (INWEH) which has Mullaperiyar dam in the list
of aged dams which should be considered for decommissioning.69
Interestingly, the Government of Kerala in its note, submitted that the Dam,
considering its age and the recent climatic changes in Kerala, has become
highly vulnerable and must be decommissioned to build a new dam.70
However, before passing any verdict, the Supreme Court again sought the
opinion of the Expert Committee.
In the entire Mullaperiyar dispute before it, the Supreme Court has
shown reluctance to engage with ideas alternative to the sustenance of the
Dam. The Court has also been indisposed to settle the dispute; it has been
advising and encouraging the parties to settle the dispute mutually. And
whenever it did attempt to deal with the dispute, its starting point has been
that “the dam is safe, what next?” This presumption of safety has restrained
the Court from exercising its mandate to guarantee the right to “life,” in all
its true sematic broadness, both of the people of Kerala (life) and Tamil Nadu
(livelihood), despite having deep sympathies and strong feeling to protect
their rights. This could be due to a subconscious awareness of the Court
about its own approach to dams that it has a historical mandate to support
and sustain dams. The next section verifies this hypothesis.

II. THE ANALYTIC OF DAM JURISPRUDENCE
Emerging from the shackles of colonialism, post-independent India had
developmental ambitions to become self-sufficient at many levels.71
18, 2021).
68. Kerala: Mullaperiyar Dam Shutters Raised After Three Years, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct.
30, 2021).
69. Duminda Perera et al., Ageing Water Storage Infrastructure: An Emerging Global
Risk, UNU-INWEH, 9-20 (2021).
70. Aaratrika Bhaumik, Mullaperiyar Dam Must Be Decommissioned, New Dam
Needed: Kerala Govt Tells Supreme Court, LIVELAW (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/kerala-govt-tells-supreme-court-that-mullaperiyar-dammust-be-decommissioned-new-dam-constructed-184502.
71. See Smruti Koppikar, In Charts: Six Challenges India Faced in 1947—And How Has
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Motivated by the goal of self-reliance and in the spirt of modernization,
which was the national philosophy of independent India, Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru declared dams as “temples of a new age.”72 By the 1960s
and 1970s, dam-building in India assumed maniacal proportions. For India,
asserts Kathleen D. Morrison, dams were not just a sign of modernity, or a
concept inspired by the Western science, but they were also continuation of
a legacy of dams which existed in the ancient and medieval Dharma tradition
in India.73
The Supreme Court of India, as the apex court of the Country, has the
responsibility to uphold national philosophies. As the nation, the Court too
cherished the ambition to promote national philosophies and lead India to
modernity—and it did participate in the national narrative on science.
Confirming this propensity of the Court and its faith in scientific modernism,
Nupur Chowdhury, writes, that
[T]he court seems to have shown an unusual deference to the vision of
national development which the state has held to be synonymous with the
development of specific technologies. This deference has even extended
to the disregard and attempts by the Court to delegitimize civil society
voices that have pursued public interest litigations in their bid to shape
technology development. The Supreme Court therefore stands today as an
actor that has consumed and is therefore subsumed by the national
narrative.74

Since dams were part of India’s narrative on modernization, the
Supreme Court too had internalized that narrative. The dam jurisprudence,
which unfolded from the Supreme Court, starkly evidences this proposition.
A. Sardar Sarovar Dam Project Over River Narmada
“Sustainability is not just ecological sustainability. It has to be also
popular sustainability”

It
Fared
in
Battling
Them,
SCROLL.IN
(Aug.
16,
2017),
https://scroll.in/article/847255/jawaharlal-nehru-set-india-on-the-path-to-prosperity-but-isit-the-noble-mansion-he-dreamed-of.
72. David Arnold, Nehruvian Science and Postcolonial India, 104 ISIS 360, 368 (2013).
See also, Bhikhu Parekh, Nehru and the National Philosophy of India, 26 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 35 (1991).
73. See Kathleen D. Morrison, Dharmic Projects, Imperial Reservoirs, and New Temples
of India: A Historical Perspective on Dams in India, 8 CONSERVATION & SOC’Y 182 (2010).
Dams in ancient and medieval India, according to Morrison, were considered “little oceans”,
to the extent of naming a dam “ocean of Dharma.”
74. Nupur Chowdhury, Role of the Indian Supreme Court in Shaping Technology
Development, 19 SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 57, 73 (2014).
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—Medha Patkar

The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project (SSDP) was conceived within the
post-independent development policy of India, impelled by the obsession for
big dams, to benefit the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya
Pradesh.75 Disagreements started to arise with the launch of the Project
itself—the earliest disagreements were about the height of the Dam and then
about the site of the Dam.76 The Khosla Committee, headed by A.N. Khosla,
appointed to prepare a Master Plan for the project, recommended a higher
and bigger dam, which was not acceptable to the states of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh, as they were concerned about an equitable allocation of
waters.77 The failure of the Khosla Committee report to find consensus
among the three states, prompted the Government of India to constitute the
Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT).78 After 10 years since its
constitution, the Tribunal gave its verdict in 1979, which went far beyond
finding a formula for sharing of water and power among the states and
recommended inter alia for “30 major, 135 medium, and 3000 minor dam
projects to harness the waters of the Narmada basin.”79 The Tribunal also
made a resettlement plan for the project-affected families.
The implementation of the rehabilitation plan was ineffective, people
were ousted from their land without compensation, resettlement and
rehabilitation. The construction of the Dam, however, commenced in 1987.80
As the construction progressed, the resettlement and rehabilitation issues
became intense and many environmental concerns also started to develop.81
At that juncture, the social movement against the Project, Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA)—the Save Narmada Movement—was initiated under the
leadership of social activist Medha Patkar.82 The movement, which started
to assert the rights of the project-affected people for resettlement and
rehabilitation, would soon become a total opposition to the SSDP, given the
many potential costs to the people and irreparable damage to the

75. THE SARDAR SAROVAR DAM PROJECT: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2 (Philippe Cullet ed.,
2007).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. M.S. Menon, Sardar Sarovar Project: Another Perspective, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
4095, 4096 (2003).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4096.
81. Id.
82. Mathew John, Interpreting Narmada Judgment, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3030, 3030
(2001).
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environment.83
In 1994, the NBA filed a Public Interest Writ Petition—Narmada
Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others—before the Supreme Court
of India to restrain the Government of India from constructing the Dam.84
The primary contention of NBA was that there were many irregularities in
the environmental clearance obtained for the SSDP.85 Other matters on
which NBA based its submission include, resettlement and rehabilitation,
threat to the ecology of the region including submergence of land-area,
health hazards, and uprooting of culture.
The NBA quite vehemently highlighted the environmental issues.
However, the Court’s response to such concerns were in the form of restating
the language in the reports of the expert committees which the Court
considered as scientific proofs. For example, responding to the NBA’s
submission that “extensive deforestation of the submergence zone had taken
place, as also part of the area had been submerged,” the Court responded that
a “number of studies were carried out and reports submitted” . . . and that the
reports “indicated that a well-balanced and viable eco-system existed in the
Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary. Moreover, with the construction of [a] dam,
water availability and soil moisture will increase and support varieties of
plants and animals.”86 Further, when NBA submitted that as per the
precautionary principle, the burden of proving that the Project would not lead
to environmental degradation is on the Respondents, the Court replied that
such a burden is only on the Respondent when the impact of the Project is
not known.87 However, in the case of SSP, the environmental impact had
been assessed by expert bodies and therefore the Respondent only needs to
adopt sustainable development which would include all necessary mitigating
steps.88 In both these cases, the Supreme Court considered expert opinion as
“pure reason” by which the Court equated “technical facts” to “social facts”
and drew conclusions based on that.89

83. Id. On the counter-hegemonic role played by the Narmada Bachao Andolan, see
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and Global
Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
345 (2005).
84. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 644, 654
(India).
85. Id. at 656-657, 663-665.
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id. at 683-84.
88. Id.
89. See Shiv Visvanathan, Supreme Court Constructs a Dam, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
4176, 4176 (2000).
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The Court did not hide its enthusiasm for dams—a Nehruvian
developmental legacy, which has completed a meaningful life—in its many
observations and in the judgment. Addressing the environmental concerns
apropos of SSP, the Court emphasized that dams do not pollute because, the
dam is “neither a nuclear establishment nor a polluting industry.”90
The construction of a dam undoubtedly would result in the change of
environment but it will not be correct to presume that the construction of
a large dam like the Sardar Sarovar will result in ecological disaster. India
has an experience of over 40 years in the construction of dams. The
experience does not show that construction of a large dam is not cost
effective or leads to ecological or environmental degradation. On the
contrary there has been ecological upgradation with the construction of
large dams. What is the impact on environment with the construction of a
dam is well-known in India.91

Responding to the contention by the Petitioner of mismanagement of
the resettlement and rehabilitation plans, and the non-fulfilment of the
obligations thereof by the states responsible, the Court made a rather
innocent reminder that the Petitioner and the people represented by the
Petitioner should have faith, as much as the Court, “in the process of research
and trust in the existence of administrative machinery.”92 The Court also
explained to the Petitioner that administrative machineries like the R&R
Sub-Group of Narmada Control Authority did take “adequate” measures,
and the state governments concerned, as per the Central Government reports,
had taken measures to implement the Master Plan.93
Uprooting of cultures, especially tribal cultures, as alleged by the
Petitioner, in the view of the Court, is a negative concept which is antithetical
to progressivism. The Court was left wondering about prioritizing “oustee
preferences” to the state-chosen conditions for them. How could the state’s
rational choice be ignored by the oustees? Instead, the oustees, according to
the Court, “should have improved or regained the standard of living that they
were enjoying prior to their displacement and they should have been fully
integrated in the community in which they were re-settled.”94 Why couldn’t
they see that the Dam is a means to their progress to modernity? With a real
estate mentality, perhaps prompted by an ignorance of the relationship

90.
(India).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 644, 684
Id.
Visvanathan, supra note 89 at 4179.
Narmada, supra note 90 at 644, 695.
Id. at 697.
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between culture and geography, if not prompted by the vexation at cultural
uprooting becoming an excuse to resist a project like the Dam, the Court
absurdly measured tribal life in terms of the quantity of land: “[i]t may be
that the grazing land was inadequate but this problem will be faced by the
entire State of Gujarat and not making such land available for them does not
in any way violate any of the provisions of the Award [of the NWDT]”.95
The Court also took great pride in the system—institutional structure
and administrative machinery—in place. It reviewed the workings of this
system in extensive detail. The Court also left no possibilities at amelioration
untouched, e.g., it reviewed the functioning of systems on health, safety,
environment, agriculture, and education, set up for the project-affected
people. It did find all these measures, and expressed happiness over them, as
steps leading to greater progress—all roads ultimately lead to the Dam. The
anxiety is whether this unabashed faith of the Supreme Court in the
machineries based on governmental reports is misplaced or not. Whatsoever,
the Court at least looked contented by all this, except that a project leading
to a dam was being challenged.
The Court in the end held that the Dam shall be constructed, and it shall
be as large as the Sardar Sarovar Dam; if not, there will not be adequate
supply of water, as water “is one element without which life cannot
sustain.”96 Then, the Court assured that it will also oversee the construction
of the Dam “to see that the system works in the manner it was envisaged,”
but it “will not transgress into the field of policy decision.” 97 “It is for the
Government to decide how to do its job. When it has put a system in place
for the execution of a project and such a system cannot be said to be
arbitrary.”98
This article does not mean to problematize the decision taken by the
Supreme Court, which is built on, and motivated by, the concept of
sustainable development. But it intends to examine closely the approach of
the Court to dams. The “balancing” of development with other social
concerns, which the sustainable development doctrine requires in its
profoundest imagination, did not happen well in Narmada Bachao Andolan
due to the Court’s enthusiasm to facilitate the construction of the Dam.
Exploring the epistemology of the sustainable development doctrine,
Judge Christopher Weeramantry in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project

95.
96.
97.
98.

Narmada, supra note 90 at 644, 698.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 713.
Id.
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(Hungary v. Slovakia) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
observed that the sustainable development doctrine aims to prevent a free
reign of development (sum total of human happiness) over the environment
(integral to sustenance of life) and vice versa and requires a reconciliation.99
He explained that the principle has ingrained in it notions of equity,
economy, conservation, equality of all creatures, and a right to life. 100 The
doctrine also has developmental elements aiming to maximize human
happiness and well-being, however, they shall not be used as a precommissioning test of developmental projects; rather, the doctrine should be
used for continuous assessments and evaluation of projects that have been
considered to be advancing human condition, both natural and social.101
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan has followed
the project implementation requirements of the doctrine, and most
effectively at that. However, when it came to examining the environmental
and human elements involved in the project, the Court, instead of taking an
ethnographic perspective, relied on the expert reports of pro-dam agencies
with development as their primary objective or those agencies with a
structural bias towards developmental projects. And, this is obvious from the
Court’s statement—”[t]he impact on environment should be seen in relation
to the project as a whole.”102 Instead of balancing between environment and
development, the Court has used development to become the tool to evaluate
environmental concerns and made the dam the means for environmental
projection, as is obvious from the following statement: “[w]hile an area of
land will submerge but the construction of the Dam will result in multifold
improvement in the environment of the areas where the canal waters will
reach”.103 The Dam appears to be larger than life in the Supreme Court’s
judgment and everything else is but a flicker from the peripheries. Critiquing
the Dam-bias of the Court, Shiv Visvanathan, gives a few manicures to the
Court’s overall approach to the Narmada dam
Narmada becomes a river of social science clichés. Environment and
human rights exist in the package but as peripherals. What defeats the
movement [NBA] is a formal idea of law and a plethora of bad social
science. The ghosts of Comte, Herbert Spencer, McClelland live in our
99. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 88, 91, ¶ 2
(Sept. 25) (Separate opinion by Weeramantry, Vice-President).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 111. The idea of Environmental Impact Assessment, which is part of the
doctrine of sustainable development, “is a dynamic principle and is not confined to a preproject evaluation of possible environmental consequences.”
102. Narmada, supra note 90 at 644, 714.
103. Id.
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court judgments threatening our poor, our marginals, our dissenters in the
name of the very values we cherish democracy, rule of law, justice. 104

B. The Tehri Dam Project Over River Bhagirathi
“This dam is built with our tears”
—Sunderlal Bahuguna

The Tehri Hydro Power Project and the Tehri Dam Project (TDP) were
approved in 1972 by the Government of India.105 The construction works
commenced in 1978.106 As in the case of every dam project, in the case of
TDP too there were serious concerns relating to the safety of the dam which
is in a high seismic zone, there is potential for destruction of the
environment, displacement, and rehabilitation. Prompted by these concerns,
a social resistance under the aegis of the movement, Tehri Bandh Virodhi
Sangarsh Samiti (TBVSS)—Tehri Dam Opposition Struggle Committee—
was started.107 The TBVSS filed a suit in the Supreme Court of India in 1985
which was rejected on technical grounds.108 In 1988, Sunderlal Bahuguna,
an environmentalist and social activist (also known as the father of the
“Chipko Movement”—a non-violent movement to protect the trees), joined
the struggle.109 He brought in the values of Gandhian Satyagraha to the
movement and fought against the four evils of the TDP, which he comically
named as “the four gifts of Tehri dam”—”atrocities, displacement,
corruption, and genocide.”110 The movement under Sunderlal Bahuguna
drew the public’s attention to the impending threat of the TDP. Mukul
Sharma summarizes the threats highlighted by TBVSS:
Fear from the Tehri dam has been a strong element in the movement. Fears
regarding safety, geology and hydrology are based on a comprehensive
and technical analysis of the project. It is said that the mountains on which
the dam is being built are crisscrossed with geological faults. The region

104. Visvanathan, supra note 89 at 4180.
105. Tehri
Dam,
IRN
Fact
Sheet,
1
(Oct.
2002),
https://archive.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attachedfiles/tehri_dam_fact_sheet.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Shekhar Pathak, Submersion of a Town, Not an Idea, 40 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3637,
3638 (2005).
108. Vimal Bhai, The Tehri Dam Project: A Saga of Shattered Dreams, in WATER
CONFLICTS IN INDIA: A MILLION REVOLTS IN THE MAKING (K.J. Joy, Suhas Paranjpe &
Biksham Gupta, eds., 2008).
109. Id.
110. Mukul Sharma, Passages from Nature to Nationalism: Sunderlal Bahuguna and
Tehri Dam Opposition in Garhwal, 44 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 35, 36 (2009).
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is seismically too active to site such a large dam, that the dam is not
designed to withstand the intensity of an earthquake which may strike the
region, that the project can place at great risk many cities and their
population downstream of the dam.111

This was, of course, in addition to the concerns surrounding destruction
of the environment and displacement and rehabilitation of the people living
in the region.
While the social movement and collective resistance continued through
all peaceful means, in 1990, the TBVSS filed a writ petition before the
Supreme Court—Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others.112 The Petition, pointed out that the “safety aspect” had
been completely ignored by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in envisaging
the TDP. It stated that the Dam “will pose a serious threat to the fife, ecology
and the environments of the entire northern India as the site of the dam is
prone to earthquake; and that the Government of India had not applied its
mind to this very important aspect in preparing the project.”113 The Court,
however, rejected the petition that there is expert opinion contrary to the
submissions of the Petitioner. In its 2-page judgement, the Court held that it
is not correct to say that the Government “has not applied its mind or has not
considered the relevant aspects of the safety of the Dam.”114 The Court also
pre-empted itself from all safety-related issues by reminding the Petitioner
that it “does not possess the requisite expertise to render any final opinion on
the rival contentions of the experts.”115 Rather, it will only “investigate and
adjudicate the question as to whether the Government was conscious to the
inherent danger as pointed out by the petitioners and applied its mind to the
safety of the dam.”116
The Court has equivocated on the actual issue before it. It showed a
judicial ingenuity that is at a high school level, by being to-the-point of what
has been semantically presented before it. Did the Court not understand that
the answer to the question—whether the Government had applied its mind
on safety or not?—is not what the Petitioner had sought? Was not judicial
ingenuity sharp enough to pierce the semantic minimalism in legal questions
to see human concerns which prompted that question? Did not the Court

111. Id, at 39.
112. Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti et al., v. State of U.P. et al., (1990) 44 SCC 1,
1 (India).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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reduce all concerns to terms of legal speech? Did it not thus create a sham of
semantic formalism to conceal its vexation at the Petitioner for daring to
question a national priority like a dam? The subsequent and final decision by
the Court would confirm that the Court had a vision and an analytic to which
it is most loyal to.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s pro-dam ruling in Tehri Bandh
Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti, construction continued on the TDP. Social
resistance to the Project too continued.117 At that juncture, a new writ petition
was filed before the Supreme Court in 1992 as N.D. Jayal and Another v.
Union of India and Others.118 The Petitioners requested the Court to order
for further “safety tests” so that fear about the project is assuaged. The
Petitioner based this submission on the allegation that “the concerned
authorities have not correspondingly complied with the conditions attached
to the Environmental Clearance.”119 The Court was also requested to
examine rehabilitation-related issues.
The Court gave its decision only on September 1, 2003. By then it had
clarified and established its position on dams in Narmada Bachao
Andolan—what the Court could do and could not do and hence, what it
would do and what it would not. The Court reminded the Petitioners of its
dam jurisprudence and that it would not rule on the construction of the dam
which is a matter of policy for the government to decide, but the Court would
monitor the construction of the dam to guarantee that the project is
sustainably executed.120 In the language of reassurance, the Court stated that
it has the duty “to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated
and people’s fundamental rights as guaranteed under the Constitution are not
transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the
Constitution.”121 But does it not imply that the duty of the Court to guarantee
fundamental rights—in the context of a developmental project like a dam—
starts at the project execution stage? Irrespective of whether the project itself
is in breach of the fundamental rights (even if of the right to “life”), is it
correct on the part of the Court to presume correctness of the part of the
government and get involved to oversee that the project does not violate any
rights of stakeholders? Mind it, the case in question is a writ petition under

117. Armin Rosencranz & Kathleen D. Yurchak, Progress on the Environmental Front:
The Regulation of Industry and Development in India, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
489, 510-12 (1996).
118. N.D. Jayal and ANR., v. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCR 1.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
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Article 32 of the Constitution of India which provides the fundamental right
to approach the Court for constitutional remedies, that is against the violation
of any of the fundamental rights of the citizens.122 In the words of B.R.
Ambedkar, the architect of the Constitution of India, Article 32 is “one of
the greatest safeguards that can be provided for the safety and security of the
individual.”123 When a “move” to the Supreme Court is made as per Article
32(1), can the Court choose to exclude—that too, based on a presumption of
correctness of a democratically elected government by the people—the
primary breach of fundamental right and to include breaches, if any, which
happen subsequent to the primary breach?
Whatsoever, the Court did not deviate even a bit from Narmada Bachao
Andolan and stated that the benefits of dams outweigh the costs: “[t]he
impact has to be examined on the project as a whole and at the same time it
should also be noticed that the construction of a dam would result in
multifold improvement in the environment of the areas where the canal
waters will reach”.124 Not only in terms of substantive matters, but also in
terms of the discursive patterns, the Court followed Narmada Bachao
Andolan, which it would also later on follow in Mullaperiyar Environmental
Protection Forum and in the Mullaperiyar original suit. That is to say,
reacting to the evidence of hydrological and seismological risks of the TDP
submitted by the Respondents, while dismissing the same, the Court said that
it did not find the matter within its remit, and decided to rely on the expert
opinion sought by the Government of India, surprisingly, the respondent in
this case.125 The Court considered the respondent’s wisdom as “mature
wisdom” than the wisdom of the Court—”[t]he consideration in such cases
is in the process of decision and not in its merits.”126
In the same vein and in the same fashion as that of Narmada Bachao
Andolan, even liberally drawing on it, the Court emphasized on the doctrine
of sustainable development—again emphasized on the essential balancing—
and reviewed the safety measures, including disaster management and
rehabilitation plans, taken by the Government of India.127 The Court also
made an allusion to the insensitive dictum on rehabilitation in Narmada
122. India Const. art. 32, cl. 2.
123. Sadaf Modak, Explained: What Have Been the Supreme Court’s Recent Observations
on
Article
32?,
INDIAN
EXPRESS
(Nov.
19,
2020),
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/article-32-and-supreme-court-fundamentalrights-7055040/.
124. N.D. Jayal, at 4.
125. Id. at 7
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10-28.

Summer 2022

HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

157

Bachao Andolan that rehabilitation is a civilizing mission of the uncivilized
by integrating them into modernity. In the case in question too, the Court
found that integration to modernity has to be performed as a moral duty of
the state by way of “properly look[ing] after” those who were being
displaced.128
The Court did not stop the TDP. 129 It disposed the writ petition by
stating that the onus of monitoring all mitigation measures is with the High
Court of Uttarakhand for it is familiar with the local conditions. 130 But in his
separate opinion, Dharmadhikari, J., explained the need for setting up fully
functional systems in place. His separate opinion is not much relevant in
terms of the merits of the case, but it is quite an eye-opener to the dam
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India. Dharmadhikari, J., pointed that
on a development project like a dam, there will always be claims and rival
claims with their own respective merits—that’s inevitable.131 The Court
cannot prioritize one over the other. Hence, a sustainable approach would be
needed. Although Dharmadhikari, J., too took the same route as the Court in
Narmada Bachao Andolan to arrive at sustainable development, he did raise
the point that within the doctrinal spaces of sustainable development, “care
has to be first given to the needs and demands of the people who live in the
hills and valley and face ouster.”132 His approach that all relevant
considerations including environmental protection, safety, and rehabilitation
shall precede the project was a step in the right direction, although within the
limited spaces. Beyond that extent of sustainability—that is, of suggesting
for necessary pre-construction environmental, safety, and rehabilitation
measures—Dharmadhikari J., did not go into the safety of the dam. But he
did endorse the continuance of all tests for ensuring the safety of the TDP.
N.D. Jayal was a victory of development, as the Court approved the
continuance of the TDP. If the Petitioner wanted a feel of victory, they could
have also felt it, as Dharmadhikari, J., had ruled for the continuance of safety
measures. But it was a battle-loss for social movements like TBVSS which
considered the impoundment and the destruction of the ecosystem
surrounding the dam area as a stagnation of the soul, and of the spontaneous

128. Id., at 20.
129. Tehri Dam Achieved its Full Potential for the First Time on 24th Sept. 2021, TEHRI
INDIA LIMITED PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.thdc.co.in/content/tehri-damachieved-its-full-potential-first-time-24th-sept-2021.
130. N.D. Jayal, at 28.
131. Id. at 32.
132. Id. at 34.
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flow of life energies.133
Both the Narmada Bachao Andolan and N.D. Jayal are representative
cases of the dam jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India. For the Court,
its own dam jurisprudence has become an analytic from which the Court
could not find an escape. Perhaps it does not want to escape, as the Court
finds a comfort in the illusory sense of justice delivery which the analytic
offers. Such is the utility of sustainable development—it can liberally bestow
on people discourses on culture, safety, protection of environment, and
human dignity, and can give the approval for developmental projects like a
dam, championing the journey of the nation to modernity.
The Mullaperiyar dam dispute, which followed both the Narmada and
Tehri dam disputes, has been so far subjected to the same analytic. But in the
case of Mullaperiyar dam, the dispute cannot languish in the analytic of the
Court, as the concern goes beyond environmental protection and is not based
on any spiritual understanding of the connection between human and nature.
Rather, it is about life—4 million lives—as it is understood in its
ordinariness. And, when the question is of human lives, high-end discourses
or assurances about the safety of a 126-year-old dam do not assuage the fear
and anxiety of the people living downstream. Mullaperiyar is a test of the
Court’s willingness and courage. Making a choice is inevitable, as it is not
the environment versus development debate that can be moderated by
discourses on sustainability. The choice is between a dam or lives of the
people. The Supreme Court understands this conundrum; it wants to break
it. But for it, the Court has to break the analytic of its dam jurisprudence.

III. TRANSCENDING THE DAM JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW ANALYTIC
FOR DAM DISPUTES
A. Reimagining Dams: A Holistic Approach
Dams have a special place in India’s developmental imagination.
Indeed, this is often attributed to a Nehruvian vision, which this article has
also done partly. This is for the reason that the Indian tryst with dams, as
many believe, was born out of a desire for modernization. But dams
becoming part of the said imagination has historical and political reasons
beyond the Nehruvian vision. That is to say, Dams existed in pre-modern
India and during the colonial reign. The oldest dam in India—the Kallanai
Dam in the State of Tamil Nadu dates back to the 2nd Century and is still

133. See GEORGE ALFRED JAMES, ECOLOGY IS PERMANENT ECONOMY: THE ACTIVISM AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF SUNDERLAL BAHUGUNA 205-25 (2013).
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functional.134 Dams continued to be built in India under many provincial
kingdoms. For the Kings, dams were not just signs of their planning and
development, but also artifacts of their legacy and culture. The cultural
element of dams also made them constituents of the cultural memory of the
Indian society, such that they remain etched in India’s historical memory.135
During the colonial period, dam construction continued in a similar
pace but in a different vein. Then, the British Government of India not only
kindled the cultural and historical memory; but they used, for the first time,
the developmental (irrigation) and environmental (flood-control and famineprevention) perspectives to dam-building. But there were complex political
motives and histories behind such perspectives and the discourses which
created them, some of them are known whereas some of them remain
puzzles. For example, dams were part of the “selective modernization” of
the British in India which used the semiotics of large dams due to the
“gigantism” of dam-structures and their ability to gift the essential water.136
The idea that civilization and modernization come in a “big way” was
synonymized with, and symbolized through, big dams.137 But what remains
a puzzle of colonial era development motive is the 999-year lease agreement
for the Mullaperiyar dam, the lifespan of which was estimated to be 50 years,
between the Secretary of State for India and the Maharaja of Travancore.
Nehruvian post-independent developmental ambition on dams had
partly been influenced by a pre-modern idea of development and partly by
the sense of modernity of the British. But the Nehruvian vision on dams
cannot be understood in simplistic terms. He considered large dams and
hydropower as means to modernity, not in a cultural or temporal sense, but
in a scientific sense, since he considered modernity as part of a
“technological age.”138 The many complex considerations that have become
constituents of the Nehruvian vision on dams are put together and succinctly
stated by Hanna Werner:
The technocrat Nehru depicts large dams as a visual landmark embodying
the successful mastery of nature, which then enables the establishment of
134. Tamil Nadu’s Ancient Kallanai Dam: An Engineering Marvel, FIN. EXPRESS (Sept.
25 2019), https://www.financialexpress.com/lifestyle/travel-tourism/tmail-nadus-ancientkallanai-dam-an-engineering-marvel/1717252.
135. See Morrison, supra note 73 at 192-93.
136. See generally Maria Kaika, Dams as Symbols of Modernization: The Urbanization of
Nature Between Geographical Imagination and Materiality, 96 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 276, 278 (2006).
137. See HANNA WERNER, THE POLITICS OF DAMS: DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES AND
SOCIAL CRITIQUES IN MODERN INDIA 34-43 (2015).
138. Id. at 69.
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a modern society in India. The dam, it has to be remembered, does not
only represent a political symbol of modernity. As an architectural artefact
it also incarnates its aesthetics. Large-scale water works reflect, like hardly
any other infrastructural intervention, a ‘modernist engineering aesthetic’
that not only signifies the modern quest for human control over nature, but
also visualized its achieved success.139

Later on, Nehru Indianized this vision by calling dams temples of
modernity, thereby linking pre-modern ambitions of India with his modernist
vision.140 Dams were not the “everything” of Nehruvian vision; in fact,
deeming so would be undermining his modernist ambition and his penchant
for science. Dams are only symbolic—of a merger of science, human
potential, gigantism, and marvel—of Nehruvian modernism.141 But instead
of understanding Nehru in the right of his imaginations, he has been narrowly
understood and interpreted by the institutions in India which turned his adage
on dams as everything about dam-related imaginations.
The Nehruvian vision has lived quite a meaningful life which had India
developing and laying foundation for further economic advancement. But
Nehruvians lived within the fragments of his dream—they believed that
since dam signifies development, there shall be more and more dams, which
has resulted in India building 5202 large dams, most of them were built after
independence.142 Commenting on this dam construction spree, Ashok Swain
reminds,
Mega dams are not anymore in fashion in most part of the world. Popular
protests have now made it almost impossible to build these dams in
democratic countries. North America and Europe have stopped building
these dams for decades. Even China and Turkey have stopped building
large dams in their heartland.143

This prompts the question; has India been correct in its stance on dams?
Perhaps developmentally yes; but certainly India has erred on the side of dam
science and dam studies. The dam, as it is conceptualized by the World
Commission on Dams (WCD) is a holistic project comprising of many
139. Id. at 81.
140. Id. at 82.
141. Id. at 82-3.
142. Ananda Banerjee, How many dams does India need?, MINT (May 25, 2015),
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/J5HAuWKfAUFVX5UyMWFtYN/How-many-damsdoes-India-need.html.
143. Ashok Swain, Mega Dams are a Trend that the World Stopped Following Long Ago,
But
What
Hasn’t
India
Yet,
OUTLOOK
(Sept.
20,
2017),
https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/mega-dams-are-a-trend-that-the-worldstopped-following-long-ago-but-why-is-india/301976.
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essential parts, rather than a monolithic development project that can be
judged in terms of the super-structure of a dam wall and the benefits accruing
from it.144 A narrow view based on the later conception of dams often lead
to parochial considerations in decision-making, which renders the process of
decision-making political.145
The Report of the WCD entitled, “Dams and Development: A New
Framework for Decision-Making, 2000” (herein after WCD Report, 2000)
states that the idea of the dam cannot be confined to the dam’s design,
construction, and operations, but it includes “the range of social,
environmental and political choices on which the human aspiration to
development and improved well-being depend. . .At the heart of the dams
debate are issues of equity, governance, justice and power—issues that
underlie the many intractable problems faced by humanity.” 146 Accordingly,
in its holism, a dam project comprises of “planning, design, appraisal,
construction, operation, monitoring, and decommissioning of dams.”147 All
these stages of a dam project have equal importance, however, in terms of
the extent of reliance on them, it may vary from dam to dam. For example, a
dam under construction should give primary focus on planning, design, and
appraisal such that the social costs of dam construction are taken into account
and the dam is hydrologically and seismologically safe; a dam constructed
through proper planning and which has strategic designs should focus on the
operations part for generating optimum results, while continuing with
regular and rigorous safety monitoring; and an age-old dam should proceed
towards decommissioning, aiming to restoring the river and its resources,
and if safety is a matter of concern, the dam should be scientifically
decommissioned in the interest of safety.
B. A New Analytic: The Supreme Court and the Dams
The above said holistic approach is relevant for the Supreme Court of
India, as it would help the Court to distil some of its biases towards dams by
moving away from its moral and ideological commitment to dams to a more
pragmatic, science-based, democratic, and humane approach. The WCD
144. See generally Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making,
REPORT ON THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter WCD Report, 2000].
145. In the Chair’s Preface to the WCD Report, 2000, Professor Kader Asmal underlines
the need for separating the above said perspectives on dam in the following words: “The dam
embodies ambitions of statement, but when politicians approach with their ambitious plans,
apprehensive peoples hold signs that say ‘Save our beloved river’”. See WCD Report, 2000,
1v.
146. WCD Report, 2000, at xxvii, xxviii.
147. Id. at xxviii.
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Report, 2000, provides a framework for decision-making, planning, and
compliance apropos of dams. This is an effective framework that has
integrated all constituents of dam projects for deliberations and decisionmaking at various levels of the projects. But this process needs judicial
oversight. Many a times when dams are commissioned, politics enters with
hidden motives to rob dams of all their ideals, values, and welfare which the
state had intended when sanctioning projects. The Court—the guardian and
custodian of justice—can therefore become the monitor of dam projects to
uphold the true values behind the construction of dams.
The Court should internalize the holistic perspective to dams. When
there are voices of dissent and opposition to dam projects, the Court should
go beyond perceiving them as anti-development voices; rather, it should see
dissent as a fight against ulterior politics and not against the state or the
government. It is no big sin to rule against a dam project if the project is not
in the interest of people. Even such ruling should also be seen as part of the
decision-making on dams. The question which the Court should ask is not
who is correct—state or the dissenters (mostly environmentalists and
people’s groups)—but what is correct. And, correctness need not always be
in building dams. The concept of dams have lived past the prime of its life,
and considering the social and environmental costs, not to discount the
hydrological and geological risks and damage associated with the dams,
many developed countries have advanced towards alternative means of
energy generation and water-supply.
One of the most important considerations with regard to dams is safety.
While the Court has shown great sensitivity towards the safety of people
living downstream, it has not had the will to make a ruling against dams in
the interest the safety of the people. Out of the said sensitivity and empathy,
the Court has stretched to the maximum and suggested effective monitoring
measures and preparations for disaster management. But its imagination on
safety did not go beyond such minimum precautionary measures, which is
understandably due to its moral commitment to dams. If there is a threat to
the safety of dams, which further poses a threat to the lives of people, safety
has to be ensured through dam decommissioning. As per the holistic
approach to dams, dam decommissioning is also part of dam projects.
The WCD Report in 2000, which advanced the holistic approach,
included decommissioning as part of a dam project. It explains that, “[d]am
decommissioning may be necessary due to safety concerns, dam owners’
concerns about lower profits, or concerns about social and environmental
impacts. Decommissioning can mean actions ranging from stopping
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electricity production to dam removal and river restoration”.148 Reviewing
the WCD Report in 2000, Kader Asmal, empirically confirms the losing
relevance of dams and the increasing numbers of dam decommissioning:
The number of large dams commissioned fell from a high of 5,418 in the
1970s, to 2,069 in the 1990s, and the downward trend is continuing. Dams
are no longer seen as the proud symbols of progress they once were, and
some countries, such as the United States, decommission more large dams
than they currently build. The debate now focuses on the practicality of
removing more dams and the cost of compensating those harmed. Dams
have become intensely controversial; the pendulum has swung to the other
extreme.149

In India, due to the involvement of politics and the cultural image of
dams—often associated with national pride and prestige—no dams have
been decommissioned. But many dams have broken, causing devastation and
destruction, including loss of life.150 If the Supreme Court is willing to look
beyond the political relevance and cultural image of dams, and to look at
dams from a scientific perspective—and to a certain extent, socioeconomic—it would realize that dams have “failed to deliver on their
promises.”151 Asmal appropriately points out that “[i]n the end the issue is
not dams, and [shall not be]. Eliminating poverty and deprivation, helping to
meet human needs and bettering human prospects is what the process of
development must address.”152
Hence, the judicial test of assessing a dam should not be motivated by
history, culture, myths, and imageries, nor it should be based on unevaluated
scientific reports. Rather, it should be based on the conditions of the people
and their needs. But assessment of such needs should not be prejudiced. That
is to say, if one set of people is benefitted by a dam, the other set might be in
grave danger due to the dam. Certainly, human life shall have priority over
everything else, be that life in the physical sense or life as it is
constitutionally guaranteed. But if a decommissioning becomes necessary,
the state has the responsibility to provide the same benefits of the dam
through alternative means to those who are affected by the decommissioning.
The state cannot evade this responsibility by making the rational choice of

148. Id. at 185.
149. Kader Asmal, Introduction: World Commission on Dams Report, Dams and
Development, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1411, 1418 (2001).
150. Arnab Roy Chowdhury, Decommissioning Dams in India: A Comparative
Assessment of Mullaperiyar and Other Cases, 23 DEV. IN PRAC. 292 (2013).
151. Id. at 298.
152. Asmal, supra note 149 at 1433.
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becoming defenders of a dangerous and destructive dam. The Court should
remind the state of this duty and ensure that the state fulfils that duty. Arnab
Roy Chowdhury points out that, “[i]t is high time that the Indian state
consider moving in the direction of selectively identifying and dismantling
those dams that are unproductive, as it embraces, in policy, the global
paradigm of sustainable development.”153 Necessary policy guidelines for
the states in the said direction should have the legitimacy of judicial orders.
The Court should also re-evaluate its approach towards social
movements against dams. In the United States, after the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, social movements became a major
catalyst of social change. Social movements thenceforth were seen as
“contentious politics,” which is an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process from “outside” of the formal corridors of politics and centers
of formal power.154 It has also enhanced the social trust towards the judiciary
and transformed the image of the court, especially the US Supreme Court, as
a potential site for contestation and social change. However, more than the
actual change, it was sense of representation and the presence of rights which
prompted social groups to take to the courts—it was a faith that the core
concern, which could even be a constituent of a larger cause, which could
not get a representation elsewhere otherwise, would be heard and
addressed.155
The Supreme Court of India had also shown empathy to social
movements and acknowledged the constitutive role of such movements in
social production—e.g., in Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh
(“protection of civil liberties, by this Court is a far, far more sacred a duty”)
and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (Constitution is an expression of
inter alia assertion of many social movements).156 However, in disputes on
dams, where development issues were at stakes, the Court did not honor its
commitments to social movements. In Mullaperiyar Environmental Forum,
Narmada Bachao Andolan, and in Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangarsh Samiti, the
petitioners, who represented social movements, approached the Court having
been motivated by a spirit similar to that which prevailed in the United States
after Brown. In Mullaperiyar Environmental Forum, the Court did not even

153. Chowdhury, supra note 150 at 297.
154. See David S. Meyer & Steven A. Boutcher, Signals and Spillover: Brown v. Board
of Education and Other Social Movements, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 81 (2007).
155. Id.
156. Nandini Sundar and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh, Writ Petition (Civil) 250 of 2007
(July 2011); Navtej Singh Johar and Others v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) 76 of
2016 (Sept. 2018).
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sense the social force and public anxieties behind the petition. In Narmada
Bachao Andolan, the Court considered the dispute as a problem between the
Central Government and a fraction of the populace—the politics of
contestation—and was reluctant to get involved in it. By stating that it will
not question the wisdom of dams, the Court had failed to recognize the
concerns of the people represented through NBA.157 In Tehri Bandh Virodhi
Sangarsh Samiti too, the Court did not see the presence of a social
movement; rather, it looked at the case as dispute between the developmental
ambitions of the government and anti-development stance of less-informed
groups. In fact, the protest against TDP was a major social movement driven
by ecological concerns and a Gandhian model of non-violent Satyagraha.
The move to the Court by TBVSS was driven by a deep-seated
environmental consciousness which dates back to the Chipko movement of
the 1960s.158
In the case of the Narmada dam, NBA drew more public and scholarly
attention before and after the Court’s judgment, than the judgement itself.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal considers NBA as a counter-hegemonic force that
used the medium of courts to create a dialectic between law and social
movements.159 It is this presence of the dialectic which the Court missed in
Narmada Bachao Andolan. The failure of the Court to see it being a dialectic
ground has cost NBA the case, although not the cause. The Court could have
facilitated this dialectic to yield better deliberations and outcomes, rather
than recusing itself from the matter. And, by such a recusal, what the court
did was to shift the dialectic to the domain of politics, which does not offer
the dialectic objectivity that courts do.
The TBVSS, at least during the leadership of Bahuguna, relied on the
“aesthetic” and the “spiritual” for its resistance. The social movement
focused on the ontological connection between self and the surroundings. It
viewed nature as an ontic projection of the self and destruction of the nature
as destruction of the self. There was also a mythical content to TBVSS’s
social activism due to the spiritualization of the Himalayan geography and
river Ganges by Bahuguna. Although this approach of Bahuguna had been
criticized for its vulnerability to ideological misappropriation, it had huge
public support in the region.160 Whatsoever, the Court’s failure to sense this
environmental consciousness, irrespective of whether one shares it or agrees
157. See S.P. Sathe, Supreme Court and NBA, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3990 (2000).
158. See Meghaa Gupta, Mahatma of the Mountains, 56 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 80 (2021).
159. See Rajagopal, supra note 83.
160. For the argument that there is in fact such a misappropriation, see generally Sharma,
supra note 110.
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with it, points to the deep-seated commitment of the Court towards dam
projects. The point is not that the Court knowing the TBVSS’s perspective
would have made a big difference in the outcomes. But had the Court
engaged with the motivation of the social movement, it could have become
wary of its own analytical traps.
The holistic approach to dams includes many phases, e.g., clearance,
rehabilitation, compensation, planning, construction, operation, and
decommissioning. Even such a holistic approach only attends to the
development part of sustainable development. But these are not all about
dams—there are many social and cultural considerations at play which may
not always come to the forefront. The Supreme Court needs to take seriously
the voices of dissent and the silences of the deprived, including suppression
of voices by the political forces. If the Court examines deeper into the causes,
goals, and functions of social movements, which most often is a consolidated
representation of the developmental periphery, it will create a safeguard
against developmental prejudices leading to outcomes. The holistic approach
will help the Court transcend its own analytic of dam jurisprudence.

CONCLUSION: SITUATING THE MULLAPERIYAR DISPUTE WITHIN
THE NEW ANALYTIC
As natural calamities hit Kerala in 2018 in the form of a devastating
flood and in 2019 in the form of massive landslides, concerns on the safety
of the Mullaperiyar dam were raised again. In January 2020, a new writ
petition was filed before the Supreme Court as Dr. Joe Joseph and Others v.
State of Tamil Nadu. Since the original suit had settled the case in favour of
Tamil Nadu, and mindful of the res judicata, Dr. Joe Joseph has only
expressed apprehensions “about the lack of proper supervision of water
levels in the dam.”161 The initial few orders passed by the Court showed no
signs of deviation from the analytic which the Court has been used to. The
Court passed many daily orders on the rule-curve for water levels and
instructed the Supervisory Committee, constituted based on the ruling in the
original suit, to continue examining gate operation schedule and reservoir
operation plan.162 The Court also allowed the State of Tamil Nadu to raise
the water level to 142 feet through another order.
Even so, these daily orders cannot settle the dispute. For that, as this
article has submitted, the Court has to transcend its dam jurisprudence and
161. Supreme Court to Hear Mullaperiyar Dam Case on Dec.10, THE HINDU (Nov. 22,
2021), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-to-hear-mullaperiyar-dam-case-on-dec10/article37622414.ece.
162. Mullaperiyar Dam Issue, supra note 14.
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adopt the holistic approach to dams. Although that can help the Court break
its notions of dam-science and outmoded sense of modernity, that alone
cannot obtain a resolution. This is for the reason that in the case of
Mullaperiyar dam, there are people with rights—right to life in its general
and particular sense—on both sides of the Dam. If, for the people of Kerala,
it is their lives which are at stake, for the people of Tamil Nadu, their
livelihood is at stake. Strictly speaking, dependence on the waters of the Dam
for 126 years has created a river-valley culture for generations of people in
the 4 riparian districts of Tamil Nadu. The dam and the river are part of their
cultural production—they have been both adaptive and neutralizing agents,
and they have generated a sense of kinship and community among the
farming population on the banks of the river. Hence, loss of the dam would
be the same as the loss of their lives. For the people of Kerala, especially
those living downstream in the district of Idukki and the other three districts,
the dam is a ticking water bomb. Official statements from Tamil Nadu and
elsewhere about the safety of the Dam did not alleviate their fear. Their fear
has a constancy which not only numbs their right to exist in joy, but also
paralyzes their involvement in social production.
While the fear could be unfounded and the dam could be safe, things
cannot be let to be as they are, for a 126-year-old dam threatens the
possibility of a sub-optimal outcome in case of a breakage—that is, the loss
of 4 million lives and the permanent loss of water for a populace—making
people on both sides of the dam worse off. Public institutions other than
courts have their structural biases which could only prompt them to see
things parochially and by taking sides. But courts’ structural objectivity and
its hermeneutical imaginations on law can lead to contextualized models of
recognition by both parties. However, the first step towards a resolution has
to be the Supreme Court coming out of its dam analytic to look at things
through a modernist lens—of development, conservation, and sustainability.
Once it develops a holistic perspective to dams, the Court could overcome
the idolization and veneration of dams and look at them as perishable human
artifacts.
If the Court takes the causes and considerations of the various social
movements seriously, as much importance as it could attribute to social
movements like Save Kerala Brigade (SKB), Mullaperiyar Samara Samiti,
and Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum, which demand for
decommissioning of the Dam, it should heed to similar social movements in
Tamil Nadu, e.g., the Periyar-Vaigai Farmers Association, which has been
opposing the construction of a new dam, and those movements which may
possibly arise out of the concerns from a dam decommissioning. However,
social movements can be instructive for the Court in that their actions will
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educate the Court on the reality and provide information on the
contemporary cultural orientation of society, so much so that they provide
“alternative cultural model and moral order that both defends normative
standards against the strategic, utilitarian, and instrumental goal seeking and
decision making of elites and points in the direction of a more democratic
formulation of collective needs and wants within society.”163 However, in
case of conflicting social movements, the Court has to synthesize their
narratives and causes. But social movements can only be used for a valueorientation on the dispute. Since the Mullaperiyar dam dispute is a conflict
of cultures as contested through the notion of existence—the culture of
sustenance (livelihood) and a culture of survival (life)—the Court should
heed to the social movements.
Retention of a 126-year-old dam is unscientific, whereas
decommissioning of the dam will have immense social cost. Hence, the
Court has to take measures to mitigate the costs by decommissioning and
recommissioning the Dam (with a plan up to its further decommissioning).
Dam decommissioning is a global practice which is gaining traction for
many developmental projects including dams.164 However, recommissioning of a de-commissioned dam would be a rarest of the rare
incident, especially when decommissioning is due to the threat for human
safety and lives. Further, the process of decommissioning and
recommissioning will have major ecological impacts; but they can be
mitigated through proper, timely, and continuing Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIA). The decommissioning can restore ecology and habitats,
whereas re-commissioning can cause further damage to the ecology.
This does not mean that the Court should not think in the lines of
decommissioning and recommissioning of the Mullaperiyar dam. This has
also been the motto of the Government of Kerala and the slogan of social
movements like SKB—”Safety for Kerala, water for Tamil Nadu.”165
However, prior to that, there should be a court-monitored mediation between
both the governments, including leaders of social movements from both
sides, in order to instill the spirt of humanism and good neighbourly-ness
behind the above said motto. The Court’s oversight in the process will help
prevent parochial political considerations, vested interest, and voices of

163. Steven M. Buechler, New Social Movement Theories, 36 SOCIO. Q. 441, 448 (1995).
164. See Mathew D. Manahan & Sarah A. Verville, FERC and Dam Decommissioning, 9
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 45 (2005).
165. Will Never Take Any Decision That May Harm the Safety of Mullaperiyar Dam:
Kerala Govt, THE WEEK (Nov. 8, 2021) https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2021/11/08/willnever-take-any-decision-that-could-harm-safety-of-mullaperiyar-dam-kerala-govt.html.
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extremism from becoming part of the mediation. Many polemical
components of the dispute can become part of the mediation, e.g., the Lease
Agreement, Terms and Conditions of the New Agreement (with operating
rights for Tamil Nadu and equitable revenue sharing with Kerala),
uninterrupted water supply to Tamil Nadu during the decommissioning and
recommissioning phase, and management of ecological sustainability during
and after the recommissioning. The EIA and similar mitigation measures
prior to the decommissioning and recommissioning processes should start
only after successful completion of mediation. The very purpose-orientedness of such mitigation measures will prompt governmental machineries to
act judiciously and engender larger cooperation from the parties.
The Supreme Court, instead of recusing itself from the matter (which
has been the case so far), should own it, as the Court is the only potential site
and effective means for settling the Mullaperiyar dam dispute. However, the
Court cannot sense its own potential and proficiency, unless it transcends its
analytic which is historically embedded in its post-independent
developmental imaginations. But once the Court does that and establishes its
authority over the matter, the Mullaperiyar issue and the Court’s engagement
with it, would become one of the finest experiments in the judicial
implementation of the doctrine of sustainable development.
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